> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://specs.enzyme.finance/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://specs.enzyme.finance/users/trust-model-update.md).

# Trust Model Update

## Trust Model Update: Asset Managers as Trusted Actors

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**Effective date: November 1, 2026, 00:00 UTC.** Vault owners should review their Asset Managers and trust assumptions before this date.
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### Summary

We are updating the trust model of Enzyme Blue to match the model already used in Enzyme Onyx.

Currently, the **Vault Owner** is the only fully trusted actor in Enzyme Blue. From **November 1, 2026**, **Asset Managers** will also be fully trusted actors.

### Why we are making this change

In practice, the Asset Managers of many of the largest Enzyme Blue vaults already hold trusted roles, with significant control over the vault and its assets. The updated trust model states this assumption explicitly and makes Blue consistent with Onyx.

### What changes

* **Trust model:** Enzyme's security assumptions treat Asset Managers as fully trusted, like the Vault Owner. Any address you add as an Asset Manager should be trusted to the same degree as the owner.
* **Bug bounty scope:** From the effective date, the Enzyme Immunefi program no longer covers issues that require a malicious or compromised Asset Manager. This includes an Asset Manager getting around a policy that is meant to restrict Asset Managers.

### What does not change

* **No policies are removed.** All policies that restrict Asset Managers stay available and keep being enforced on-chain. Examples include `AllowedAdaptersPolicy`, `AllowedAdaptersPerManagerPolicy`, `AllowedExternalPositionTypesPolicy`, `AllowedExternalPositionTypesPerManagerPolicy`, `AllowedAdapterIncomingAssetsPolicy` and `CumulativeSlippageTolerancePolicy`.
* You can keep using these policies to limit what your Asset Managers can do. However, treat them as operational guardrails, not as a security boundary against a malicious Asset Manager.
* Vulnerabilities that do not rely on a trusted role acting maliciously stay in scope, just as before.

### Transition period

* **Until October 31, 2026, 23:59 UTC:** the current trust model applies. Only the Vault Owner is fully trusted. Bug bounty reports sent before the cut-off are assessed under this model.
* **From November 1, 2026, 00:00 UTC:** the updated trust model applies. Asset Managers are fully trusted actors.

### What vault owners should do

Before November 1, 2026:

1. **Review every Asset Manager** assigned to your vaults. Only keep addresses you would trust with the same level of control as the Vault Owner.
2. **Remove any Asset Manager you do not fully trust**, or replace them with an address you control.
3. **Review your trust assumptions.** If you rely on asset-manager policies as protection against a malicious manager, remember that from the effective date a manager bypassing them is not covered by the bug bounty program.

Asset Managers should also read this update and the related documentation so that they understand the responsibilities of a trusted role.